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JOHN S. BRADwAY t
The modern family, like other human institutions, is subject to the
constantly varying pressures of social, economic and psychological condi-
tions, among them being the age old conflict between individualism and
regimentation. Interest in reaching a stable equilibrium is shown by the
principals, their respective kin, the church and the state.' The tide of con-
troversy sways presently back and forth.2 The proponents of individual-
ism 3 are interested in experiments such as those in Russia.4 Their point
of view, in this country, is suggested by such principles and policies of the
law as: disapproval of agreements in restraint of marriage; 1 the general
requirement of extreme provocation as an element in annulments of mar-
riage on the ground of fraud, duress or mistake; 0 the tendency to construe
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I. May and Blinn, Legislative Trends in Family Law (1937) 2 AM. Soc. REV. 696.
2. Folsom, Changing Values in Sex and Family Relations (1937) 2 id. at 717; The
Modet American Family (1932) 16o ANNALS 1-222 (a collection of some 25 articles on the
family).
3. CALVERTON, THE BANKRUPTCY OF MARRIAGE (1928); ELLIS, LITTLE ESSAYS OF LOVE
AND VIRTUE (1922) ; ELLIS, MORE ESSAYS OF LOVE AND VIRTUE (1931) ; KIRcEWEY (ed.),
OUR CHANGING MORALITY (1930) (a symposium); SCHMALHAUSEN AND CALVERTON (ed.),
WOMAN'S COMING OF AGE (1931) (a symposium); RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS (1929).
4. Fairchild, The Status of the Family in the Soviet Union Today (1937) 2 AM. Soc.
REv. 61g.
5. 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1931) 52, 53: "Restraint of marriage was gen-
erally disfavored at common law, being opposed to the public policy of encouraging matri-
mony ...
"Statutes relating to restraint of marriage are found in seven states only. . . . Five
in identical words enact that 'every contract in restraint of the marriage of any person other
than a minor is void'."
6. I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 223-229: "The most important remaining
grounds upon the basis of which marriage is prohibited are force or duress, and fraud, occur-
ring at the time of the marriage and as an inducing factor in its procurement. The existence
of either force or fraud obviously prevents there being such free consent as is necessary for
a fully valid marriage.
"Forty-two jurisdictions have either civil or criminal statutes, or both upon the effect of
force or fraud upon the marriage contract. Nineteen expressly state that a marriage induced
by force, coercion, or duress is voidable at the suit of the innocent party, while twenty-three
jurisdictions enact that marriages where fraud has been present may be annulled."
In Zeigler v. Zeigler, 174 Miss. 302, 164 So. 768 (I935), 70 U. S. L. Rxv. 175 (1936),
a bill was filed by the plaintiff against her husband, who was living apart from her, for the
separate maintenance of herself and her baby. In affirming a decree for the plaintiff direct-
ing provision for her support and that of the child, the court said: ". . . a marriage is not
only a contract affecting the rights of the immediate parties but is a legal status affecting
materially the public, and where it is sought to annul a marriage contract on the ground of
duress, it must be shown by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that the duress was
(823)
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marriage statutes as directory rather than mandatory 7 and relationships
purporting to be marriages as voidable rather than void; 8 the recognition
of common law marriages; 9 the hesitation in declaring a formal marriage
invalid because of irregularities. 10
The Anglo-Saxon legal tradition," affected by the influence of the
frontier,12 calls for a modified control by the state over the family.13 At
the other extreme are experiments in Germany and Italy.14
The present article is thrown into the scales on the side of modified
regimentation. It views with alarm statistics showing an increase in family
dominating throughout the transaction and to the extent of destroying freedom of action."
Id. at 307, 164 So. at 769. See also Note, Duress-Whether It Makes Marriage Void or
Voidable (1907) 7 COL. L. REV. 128.
Concerning annulment because of misrepresentation, see Wetstine v. Wetstine, 114 Conn.
7, 157 AtI. 418 (1931). Defendant deceived plaintiff as to name, nationality, age and parent-
age, object being to conceal parentage of illegitimate child. Wife had lived with a married
man in illegal cohabitation prior to marriage. Plaintiff had intercourse with defendant prior
to their marriage. After the marriage plaintiff learned of the illegitimate child, but contin-
ued to live with defendant for four months. Held: Plaintiff condoned her prenuptial un-
chastity, and having had prenuptial intimacy with her cannot claim divorce for deceit as to
her chastity. Misrepresentations as to age and nationality are not enough to justify a
divorce.
7. I VERNIER, AmEucAN FAMILY LAWS 104: "The courts have very generally adopted
the principle that a statute will not be construed to abolish common law marriages unless
there are express words of nullity present. The application of this principle in various juris-
dictions by different courts has resulted in no little confusion. There has been no agreement
upon the question, what constitutes 'words of nullity' in a statute? nor upon the question,
When are the requirements of marriage solemnization and license law merely directory and
when are they mandatory? For if the statute is mandatory, then common law marriage must
be considered abolished where the statutes themselves contain no very clear statement that the
one and only way in which a valid marriage may be contracted is as declared by the legis-
lature, the validity of the common law marriage has generally been sustained. .... i
8. See recent case note, Marriage-Necessity of Procuring a License to Render a Cere-
monial Marriage Valid (1931) 20 CALIF. L. REv. 9o.
9. 1 VERNIER, AMEmCAN FALmY LAWS 102-103: "So far as America is concerned it is
clear that informal marriages based on mutual assent, without ceremony or officiant, have
been considered valid as common law marriages by a majority of the states. . . . They
have been expressly repudiated by statute in very few states; and in many states such mar-
riages have been held to survive even in the fact of elaborate regulations governing licensing
and solemnization of marriages."
See also KoEGEI, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1922) ; Black, Com-
mon Law Marriage (1928) 2 U. OF CINN. L. REy. L. REv. 113, 133; Brickwell, Common Law
Marriage (igio) 44 Am. L. REv. 256-68.
10. 38 C. J. 1279, 1280: "To constitute a valid marriage the essentials common to all
contracts, capacity and consent must be present. Moreover the general rule is that these are
the only indispensable requisites to the creation of a valid marriage; and while in practically
all jurisdictions the statutes prescribe additional requirements, it is well settled that such
statutes are to be construed as directory merely, unless they expressly declare that a marriage
contrary to their provisions shall be invalid."
ii. NIMKOFF, THE FAMILY (1934) 153-154.
12. ADAMS, PROVINCIAL SociEry, 1690-1763 (1928) IO et seq.; POUND, THE SPIRIT OF
THE COMMON LAW (1921) 35-36.
13. (1937) 6 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 65.
14. Clifford Kirkpatrick, Recent Changes in the Status of Women and the Family in
Germany (1937) 2 Am. Soc. REV. 65o; Taxing Gernan Bachelors (July 19, 193o) io6 LIT-
EARmY DIGEST 14; Dictatorships of Europe Strive to Build Up Their Populations, N. Y.
Times, Aug. 3o, 1936, § 4, p. 5, col. 6; 44r2 Italians Wed in Day to Obtain Fascist Award,
N. Y. Times, April 23, 1935, p. 5, col. 4; Gernan Marriage Fundy, N. Y. Times, March 23,
1934, p. 22, col. 4; Italy Pushes Marriages, N. Y. Times, May 16, 1935, p. 25, col. 3.
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dissolution. 15 It is based on the idea that extreme individualism is unwise
and dangerous because it assumes that a layman is capable of acting as his
own social diagnostician. Various professional groups have spent time
and effort educating the public to believe that, in modem civilization, any
self diagnosis, unless checked against an expert's judgment, is unscientific. 6
The particular segment of the field of family relations to be considered
here is the breakdown caused by annulments. So much attention has been
directed to the more spectacular problem of divorce and its associated items
of alimony and custody of children, that the catastrophic results of an annul-
ment are too often forgotten or unnoticed. The present article will con-
sider, against an historical background, the social ineffectiveness of the
present machinery for administering the law of annulment and will make
certain remedial proposals.
I. An Historical Note
The problem of annulment may be considered from the standpoint of
releasing for legal cause from the teclmical bonds of matrimony one person
or two people whose future happiness requires freedom. It may also be
regarded as a belated and often frantic effort to correct a mistake. Adopt-
ing arbitrarily the second of these positions one inquires where to lay the
blame. It may be upon the principals, their respective kin, the church or
the state. If blame can be laid at a particular door, the first step in achieving
a remedy may have been taken.
In primitive civilizations the preliminaries to marriage were primarily
in the hands of the respective kin. Emphasis was placed on economic values
15. LICHTENBERGER, DIVORCE I05-107: ". . . during this period of 63 years, i867-1929,
a total of 4,324,245 divorces were granted in continental United States. There were 9,937
granted in 1867, and 2o,468 in I929 ...
"From these figures it is perceived readily that the increase in the number of divorces is
both persistent and rapid. . . .
"The divorce rate is the most significant index we have to marriage instability. It is a
fair measure of the amount of marriage dissolution which is legally sanctioned. It is by no
means, however, a complete or satisfactory index ...
"Divorce . . . is not synonymous with marriage breakdown. It is, on the contrary,
merely the legal recognition of the fact that the marriage relation ended at some time in the
past. A divorce cannot be secured unless and until this fact has been established. Many
married persons have terminated their marital relations in fact, but have felt content to live
apart without obtaining a divorce ...
"It frequently is remarked that 'desertion is the poor man's divorce' .... Professor
Earl E. Eubank explains: 'The poorer classes . . . carry their troubles to the divorce
court less frequently. First of all, the expense is well nigh prohibitive for the very poor.
Second, the prohibition of the Roman Catholic Church is particularly influential among the
masses of poor in cities who, owing largely to European parentage are predominantly Cath-
olic. Third, there is among those classes, particularly among the immigrants, an ignorance
of the procedure necessary to secure divorce...."
See also MARSHAIL An MAY, THE DivoRCE COURT (1933); Hanldns, Divorce (193)
5 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 182-184.
16. CRA.mp (ed.), NosTR ms AxD QUACKERY (2d ed. 1912) (articles on the nostrum
evil, quackery, and allied matters affecting the public health; reprinted from the Journal of
the American Medical Association).
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and family prestige.' 7 The father of the bride, or a member of her family,
often engaged in commercial bargaining in the course of which he deter-
mined whom she should marry. The Roman paterfamilias, during the
Republic, supervised a different sort of ceremony,' 8 but he too had the final
word as to his prospective son-in-law. 19 During the Empire a degree of
individualism, or, if one prefers, laxness, prevailed, approximating modern
conditions. 20 While the family was the watchdog of the road to matri-
mony, its effectiveness did not remain constant from one era to the next
and blame for mistakes may be properly laid at its door. There is his-
torical evidence of wide fluctuation from severe regimentation to a free-
dom in which the watchdog reminds one of the famous descriptions by
Petronius. 2
1
The Medieval Church later assumed a large responsibility for the pro-
tection of family life. It provided the concept of marriage as a sacrament
and therefore indissoluble. It created, inter alia, two administrative devices:
the banns,22 which gave desirable publicity to the proposal to create the
relationship; 23 and annulment, 24 a convenient way of escape. 25  It took an
17. GOODSELL, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY (1928) 63; 2 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) 87-88; i WESTERMARCx, HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE (5th ed.
I921) 5i. For a discussion of marriage by purchase, see I WESTEDMARCK, op. cit. supra (3d
ed. 1903) 392-397.
I8. CoRBErr, Forms of Marriage in THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE (I930) 68.
I9. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (1927) 116: "While the spousalia created no legal
duty, there was a powerful moral duty, and since the lex Ulia of Augustus, even a legal com-
pulsion on the father's part to seek, and certainly not unreasonably to prevent, the marriage
of his son or daughter. Celibacy entailed disabilities which no one willingly assumed, and
which irrational opposition on her father's part might easily force on his children.
"If marriage was simple and informal, divorce was almost equally so, not only the
couple itself, but their paterfamilias, could end the marriage by repudiation."
For the power of the paterfamilias, see id. at Io6-iio; and WALTON, HISTORICAL INTRO-
DUCTION To ROMAN LAW (4th ed. 1920) 70-74, n. 30.
20. 3 WESTERMARCK, op. Cit. supra note 17, at 319-323. See also, LICHTENBERGER,
DIVORCE 55-56.
21. PETRoNIus, SATYRICON (Heseltine's trans. 1913) 41.
22. See 2 CATHOLIC ENcYC. (1936) 256, for a discussion of the purpose and operations
of this device.
23. AyRINHAC, MARRIAGE LEGISLATION IN THE CODE OF CANON LAW (1932) 73-85: "It
is an axiom in common law that all men have from nature the right to marry ...
"This right, however, is not absolute, nor absolutely free in its exercise. Marriage estab-
lished primarily for the good of the race, and only secondarily for that of the individual, must
be under the control of the social authority; it is a contract and, like any other contract, it
must be subject to certain regulations which may render it unlawful or invalid. Obstacles to
a valid or lawful marriage are called impediments ..
"Impediments are divided into major and minor. The minor impediments are:
I. Consanguinity in the third degree of the collateral line.
2. Affinity in the second degree of the collateral line.
3. Public decency in the second degree.
4. Spiritual relationship.
5. The impediment of crime arising from adultery with a promise of, or an attempt
at, marriage, even by a merely civil contract.
"The major impediments are all the others."
24. See 16 ENcYc. BRIT. (i4th ed. 1929) 595; see also I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS 237-238: "Suits for annulment are closely akin to those for divorce. From a practical
point of view they partake of certain common characteristics. (I) The purpose of both is
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aggressive stand against irregular unions. 26 As a family watchdog, the
ecclesiastical establishment, in co~peration with the medieval family, was a
powerful force for regimentation. 27  It prevented rash and ill-advised part-
nership and remedied its mistakes in a more orderly fashion than could be
done by the parties themselves.
The Protestant reformation signalized the advance of greater indi-
vidualism in marital affairs.28 The hold of the ecclesiastical establishment
was weakened.2 9  The disciplinary and protective power of the family de-
clined in the presence of such social, economic and psychological forces as
the industrial revolution 3 0 and the Women's Rights Movement.31  The
conflict of underlying philosophies and the attempts at compromise of a
bewildered public increased.
The state has been forced into the role of family watchdog. For this
function it has few qualifications. It could hardly borrow from the family
judicially to terminate the marriage, restoring the parties to the full legal status of single
persons. (2) The same grounds may entitle parties to an annulment, a divorce, or either,
depending on the jurisdiction. . . . (3) There ought to be provided in each case a sane
solution of the property rights of the parties, the support and maintenance of wife and chil-
dren. . . . (4) The essential nature of the actions being the same, it would seem that sim-
ilar procedure, service of process, rules of jurisdiction, and other details might well be fol-
lowed, although in fact, they more often are not.
"But in theory, the actions of annulment and divorce are distinguished by important dif-
ferences. (I) The decree of annulment, barring legislation to the contrary, is a judicial
declaration that no valid marriage ever existed between the parties. (2) Proceeding upon
that basis, neither party acquired the usual marital rights, so that only a return to the status
quo at the time of the marriage would seem to be required. This involves a return of the
property of each, but does not necessarily entitle the wife to any further rights by way of
maintenance, alimony, or property division. (3) If there were, theoretically, no marriage at
all between the parties, the decree of nullity results in the bastardizing of any children of the
marriage, unless they are otherwise protected by statute. In these and other less significant
ways the two actions are distinguishable, and the legislation governing them has as often
been motivated by these theoretical considerations as it has been by more practical reasons of
policy."
25. I6 HA~suRy, LAws oF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1935) 496, 499; 27 THE ENGLISH AND
EMPinE DIGEST (1926) 264-272.
26. AYRINHAc, op. cit. supra note 23, at 51-52.
27. GOODS.LI, op. cit. supra note 17, at 69, 71.
28. Protestantism (937) 6 ENcYC. Soc. Sci. 571-575.
29. Ibid.; see also CARTn, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CouRTs (5th ed. x927) 148.
30. BossAp.r, SOCIAL CHANGE AND SocrAL PROBLEMS (934) 56o-566, discusses the
changes in family life resulting from the Industrial Revolution. "The social cohesion of the
earlier form of the family cemented by joint participation in various common enterprises, is
passing. Particularly has the passing of the economic function of the home removed the bond
which formerly knit the family together. As a result, its individual members have been 'lib-
erated' each to pursue first his or her own work, and, subsequently and increasingly, other
aspects of their individual lives." Id. at 566. See also, ELLIOT AND MERRILL, The Changing
Family in SocIAL DISORGANIZATION (1934) 425-426.
31. BOOTH, WOMAN AND Soc=ErY (1929) 22o: "Thus the general trend of the movement
[Woman's Movement], in spite of the unquestionable sincerity of its claim to be an agent of
moral betterment is (by virtue of a historical logic) such as to encourage a type of education
and occupation and a mental attitude toward life and toward the opposite sex, which works
steadily against marriage and against the home." See also, FisKE, THE CHANGING FAMILY
(1928) 79-98.
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the primitive disciplinary sanctions of ostracism and death.8 2  Such action
would represent too extreme regimentation. The patriarchal household was
still too much of a quasi-independent state 33 to permit such an invasion.
It did borrow from the church the concepts of publicity, registration and
annulment; but these procedures were torn from their medieval background
of a lifelong ecclesiastical probation enforced by confessional, penance and
excommunication.
In such a period of change the compromise concepts, which we employ
today in annulment cases, were developed. They may have been useful
when formulated. The present test of social utility is whether they remained
flexible enough to adjust to changing social economic and psychological
conditions. One need not labor the point that conditions have changed. It
is, therefore, justifiable today to subject these concepts and their attendant
administrative machinery to careful scrutiny and evaluation. Sociologists
declare that the functions of the modem family are comparatively few and
its power slight.84 In England the control of the church has passed to the
civil courts 3 5 which grant decrees of nullity with restraint.36 In the United
States compulsory church authority and traditions did not survive the impact
with the frontier.
Increasingly, marriages took place which resulted in difficulties, dis-
illusionment and disintegration. The community came to the conclusion
that some of the causes of breakdown arose prior to the marriage and that
principles of law should be laid down to express public policy in such cases.
Where a person presented an appropriate set of facts to the court, a decree
would issue proclaiming either that there never had been a marriage or that
none existed from the time of the decree. The concepts and administrative
machinery were decreed by the various state legislatures beginning with
32. R-ADiN, Father and Child in op. cit. supra note ig, at io6-iog; WALTON, op. cit. supra
note ig, at 70-74.
33. SOHM, INSTITUTES OF Romx LAW (3d ed. i9o7) 459. See also, GOODSELL, THE
FANILY AS A SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION (1915) 327-332.
34. JAcOBS AND ANGELL, A RESE ACH IN FAMILY LAW (1930) 37-38: "The great loss
of function has made the family institution shrink; about the only functions left are the bear-
ing and early care of the young, affection between the spouses and as to children, and as a
property holding and disposing unit."
35. 1o HALSBURY, op. cit supra note 25, at 631: "Complete divorce by judicial process in
England first came into operation in I858 by virtue of the Act of 1857 (Matrimonial Causes
Act) ; this act perpetuated the old ecclesiastical practice with regard to nullity and judicial
separation (divorce a mensa et thoro). A series of amending and supplemental acts have
been consolidated in the Supreme Court of judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, which now
embodies the code of law governing matrimonial causes."
Citations to these statutes are: MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT, 1857, 20 & 21 VIcr. c. 85;
SUPREmE CouTr OF JUDICATURE Act, i925, 15 & i6 GEo. V, c. 49.
36. 10 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 25, at 639-645: "Marriage is void ab initlo in cases
of: (I) bigamy . . . ; (2) where the marriage has been induced by duress, or mistake;(3) insanity of one spouse at the time of the ceremony; (4) the prohibited degrees of con-
sanguinity or affinity; (5) marriage not solemnized in due form; and (6) non-age, marriage
is only voidable where one of the parties is incapable of consumating it."
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the special formalities for marriage,3 7 and marriage licensing acts.38 The
presence of common-law marriage 3 9 in many jurisdictions reminds one that
here is still a compromise.
It is not easy to say who is the modem family watchdog. It may be
the individual contemplating matrimony, the marriage license clerk, the
judge of the annulment court or some one else. The statement of the
situation indicates either confused thinking or a compromise open to criti-
cism. If one picks upon the marriage license clerk, he may reply that his
functions are too limited to enable him to do such work.40 Some statutes
continue to impose obligations upon clergymen 41 and other public offi-
cials. 42 They speak in terms of punishing officials who perform marriage
ceremonies of ineligibles. This decentralization of responsibility makes
administration difficult. The regulatory provisions speak in terms of regis-
tration, a legal concept of value in property transactions rather than in the
37. EVERSLEY, LAW OF THE DoMEsTIc RELATIONS (4th ed. 1926) 15-19, discussing Lord
Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753, and the Marriage Acts of 1823, 1836, and I898. See also,
HALSBTJRY, op. cit. supra note 25: on the definition of marriage, 6 id. at 252-253, 16 id. 263;
on banns, ii id. at 698, 16 id. at 286; on capacity to marry, I6 id. at 281; on civil marriage,
I6 id. at 305; on solemnization of marriage, 16 id. at 299.
38. I VERNIER, AmERIcAN F Imy LAWS 59: "All of the states as well as Alaska, the
District of Columbia, and Hawaii now have marriage license laws. These laws differ widely
in their numerous details. No two are exactly alike. They are, however, all the result of a
common motive: the desire of the states to require that persons who intend to marry must
first secure the formal permission of the state."
39. I id. at 59, 6o: "Although all of the American Jurisdictions have marriage license
laws, that does not mean that a license is in all cases essential to the validity of marriages.
License statutes are sometimes merely directory, not mandatory in their terms, or are so con-
strued by the courts. . . . Some of the states specifically provide that non-compliance with
the license law does not invalidate an otherwise lawful marriage; in others the same result
has been reached by judicial construction.
"Three of the States, Georgia, Maryland and Ohio allow banns to be published as a sub-
stitute for a license." (See i id. at io2-IO3, n. ii.)
See also: Black, supra note 9; Braxton, Resumption of Cohabitation after Divorce as
Constituting Common Law Marriage (1932) 36 LAW NOTES 50; Buckell, Common Law Mar-
riage (Igio) 44 Am. L. REV. 256; Gilkes, Validity of Common Law Marriage (1933) 3 ORE.
L. REy. 28; Hall, Common Law Marriage in New York State (930) 30 COL. L. REv. i;
Lightner, Common Law Marriage in Wisconsin (1923) 6 MARQ. L. REv. 82; Note, Common
Law Marriage Again Abolished in New York State (1933) 67 U. S. L. REv. 275.
4o. i VERNIER, A mcAx FA.mmy LAws 128, 129: "Facts concerning the parties to a
marriage contract which must be ascertained in some way are of two main classes: First are
those which are required primarily for purposes of complete and accurate records . . . ;
second . . . are the facts which must be proved in order that the legality of a contemplated
marriage may be established. . . .
"Since in all American jurisdictions the parties are generally required to secure a mar-
riage license, and since this represents in effect the official stamp" of approval of the state
upon a proposed marriage, it is apparent that all essential facts should be ascertained prior to
the issuance of the license. Also it is proper and practicable under the circumstances, that
the duty of securing such facts should be placed upon the officer who is authorized to issue
marriage licenses. As a matter of fact, in all of the states this burden, in part at least, is
imposed upon him. The only other person who shares in the task at all is the solemnizing
officer, who in six states has some positive duties in this regard. Forty-four of the fifty-onejurisdictions considered have positive and specific legislation on the ascertainment of facts
pertinent to the marriage contract. Thirty-seven of these place the enforcement responsibility
entirely on the licensing officers, while in the remaining six, officiants share that burden."
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
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protection of the individual. In a period when the public is expecting
many things from government, it is reasonable to inquire what can be done
here. It is recognized that the state by various criminal laws attempts to
discourage and deter the commission of particular offenses against the
family. The present inquiry is in the civil field. The problem appears to
be one of leaving the "welcome" mat before the door of marriage, but
placing beside it a single discriminating public watchdog which will growl
and show his teeth when certain persons who, as a matter of policy are
already forbidden the house, attempt either through grievance or malice to
gain entry.
II. The Present Situation Is Ineffective
There is nothing to be gained in an article such as this by an effort to
demonstrate statistically or estimate the number of annulments per year in
the United States.43  It is assumed that there are too many; that people,
who are prohibited from marrying under penalty of annulment, continually
disregard long established principles of public policy; that this practice
swells the already alarming number of broken homes; that the social,
economic and psychological consequences to the individual who innocently
becomes involved in a void or voidable marriage are sufficiently serious to
warrant a focusing of public attention. A critic may complain of the
modern social inadequacy of a compromise concept which endeavors to
encourage formal marriage by limiting the obstacles at the threshold largely
to publicity and registration and yet recognizes and voids certain marriages
as against public policy. Such a procedure casts too much responsibility
upon the individual. Criticism of the administrative machinery may be
based upon the ineffectiveness of attempting to solve modern annulable
marital problems by a device borrowed without its supporting background
from the ecclesiastical law of the middle ages. The present system is
remedial and not preventive; it drags the most intimate domestic relations
through the ordeal of litigation; it solves only a limited number of the less
serious problems confronting the parties; and fails to assert a reasonable
interest by the state in its fundamental task of helping to build stable
families.
43. JACOBS, CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1933) 170-355; MADDEN, CASES ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1928) 572-627; McCAE, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON PERSONS
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1936) 161-264; McCuRDY, CASES ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1927) 45-151.
Brown, Duress and Fraud as Grounds for the Annulinent of Marriage (1935) 10 IND. L.
J. 473; Crouch Annulment of Marriage for Fraud in New York (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 401;
Emmerglick, Nullity of Marriage for Fraud (1931) ig Ky. L. 3. 295; Vanneman, The Annul-
ment of Marriage for Fraud (1925) 9 MINN. L. REV. 497. Notes: Validity of Marriage En-
tered in Jest (1921) 11 A. L. R. 215; The Nature of Fraud Required to Annul a Marriage
(1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 662; The Annulment of Marriage on the Ground of Fraud (1925) 73
U. OF PA. L. REv. 195. See also recent case notes: (1934) 14 B. U. L. REV. 837; (1918) 6
CALIF. L. REV. 224; (1874) I CENT. L. J. 235; (1907) 7 COL. L. REv. 128; (1920) 20 COL1. L.
REv. 708; (1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 194; (1917) 3 CORN. L. Q. 51; (193o) 64 U. S. L. REV.
617; (1922) 29W. VA. L. Q. 6o.
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Preventive law is as important in the handling of human problems as
is preventive medicine. At the present time, well recognized principles of
law have decreed that certain persons should not marry; and if they do, an
annulment is granted the innocent spouse as a matter of right. In the pro-
hibited group are people who go through a ceremony lacking mutual as-
sent; 44 the scoundrel who uses fraud or force to accomplish his fell pur-
poses; 4" children under a certain age; 46 a person whose mental or physical
health is not up to the standard of the particular jurisdiction; 47 individuals
whose nuptials would violate laws against miscegination, incest and con-
sanguinity; 48 the ignorant or malicious person who, with one undissolved
marriage to his credit, contracts another. 49  Reports of appellate tribunals,
44.2 ScHouMER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1921)
I411: "The element of imperfect consent is readily associated with cases of the present
class. Thus, if a person is unwittingly entrapped into a marriage ceremony, not meaning nor
affording reason for the other party to believe that it should be binding, this marriage may be
repudiated. And in general a mock marriage in jest is no marriage."
On the general subject of the effect of marriage in jest, see Note, Validity of Marriage
Entered in Jest (1921) ii A. L. R. 215. See also the following recent case notes: (1931)
ii B. U. L. REV. 296; (1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 194; (1931) 19 GEo. L. J. 239; (1930) 9 N. C.
L. REV. 96; (192.2) 29 W. VA. L. Q. 6o. Cases dealing with the problem are: Hand v. Berry,
170 Ga. 743, I54 S. E. 239 (193o), 64 U. S. L. REV. 61g; Reszel v. Reszel, 73 Mich. 133, 40
N. W. 858 (1883) ; McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225 (1870) ; Crouch v. Wartenburg, 86
W. Va. 664, 104 S. E. 117 (1920).
45. Supra note 8. See also: Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87 (1859) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds,
3 Allen 6o5 (Mass. 1862) ; Smith v. Smith, 61 Mich. 6o7, 17 N. W. 79 (883) ; Harrison v.
Harrison, 94 Mich. 559, 54 N. W. 275 (1893); Ferlat v. Goon, I Hopk. Ch. 478 (N. Y.
1825); Scott v. Sebright, L. R. 12 P. 21 (1886); Moss v. Moss, [1897] P. 263. See also
references cited supra note 43.
46. I VERNIER, AMERICAN FmiLy LAWS 115: "According to the common law, males of
fourteen years of age and females of twelve could make a binding contract of marriage. In
the United States today all but twelve states have by statute changed the common law rule
by providing for higher age limits. But there is still a wide discrepancy beween the age quali-
fications for entering marriage contracts and that required for other contracts.
See also, RICHMiOND AND HALL, CHILD MARRIAGES (1925); MARRIAGE AND THE STATE
(1929) ; Bossard, The Age Factor in Marriage-A Philosophical Study (1931) 38 Am. J. OF
Soc. 536.
47. i VmRER, AMEmCAN FAMILY LAWS 199-206: "The most modem development in
the field of prohibited marriage is undoubtedly the prohibition of marriages on account of
disease. Although only a half of the American jurisdictions have, as yet, adopted such legis-
lation, there would seem to be little basis for questioning the wisdom of prohibiting the mar-
riage of persons who are . . . afflicted with any serious transmissible disease."
For the status of legislation governing marriages prohibited because of disease, see Table
XIV. I id. at 200.
Similar problems with respect to mental deficiency are discussed in I id. at 188-i6,
where the author indicates that all but eight states have legislation on this subject. See also
Table XIII, I id. at 10 et sea.
48. Marriage between those within the "prohibited degrees" was barred by the statute of
32 HFN. VIII, c. 38 (1540). What those degrees were was determined by reference, not to
the Bible, but to certain prior statutes; namely, 25 HEN. VIII, c. 22 (1533), and 28 HEN.
VIII. C. 7 (1536). These degrees are set forth in chart form in 2 Co. INST. *683.
See I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 183: "Upon the subject of marriages prohibited
because of consanguinity all fifty-one of the American Jurisdictions have statutes. Moreover.
surprising as it may seem there is, up to a certain point, a laudable degree of uniformity in
the statutes." Table XI. i id. at 176-181, shows the relationships by consanguinity within
which marriage is prohibited. See also Brown, Consangudnous Marriages-A Scientific
Approach (193o) 15 ST. Louis L. REv. I7t.
A0. See recent case notes: (934) 6 Miss. L. J. 443; (1931) 4 So. CAL. L. REv. 244:
(1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. RFV. 309.
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records of trial courts, domestic relations courts,50 information available in
law offices, legal aid societies, 51 and social agencies, 52 indicate that such
persons are constantly marrying and that the annulment process is being
used to untangle distressing situations. In a substantial number of such
cases, if the facts were available in advance, the innocent misinformed party
never would go through with the ceremony. In other cases protection is
necessary to prevent the headstrong, reckless individual from bringing about
a situation contrary to public policy and which, if completed, will require
expense, time and energy on the part of other people to untangle. What
practical social benefit is served by a policy of the law in domestic cases
which waits until the horse is stolen before locking the door? A fact find-
ing study of the number and condition of the innocent victims of the present
individualistic policy of watchful waiting might reveal circumstances to
outweigh, in the mind of an impartial reasonable man, the desires of another
group to have the road to marriage open to all. A man with nothing to
hide might be more willing than the rascal to accept a preliminary public
investigation into the facts as to whether his marriage would be legal. The
declaratory judgment device is useful in other fields of law. Why not here?
The consequences of the present remedial policy are more serious to
the wronged spouse than would be the case in a property problem. Annul-
ment may declare that a form of marriage is a nullity and thereby wipe the
legal record clean; but it does not, and, in the nature of things, cannot
return the plaintiff to the social, economic and psychological status quo.
Preventive professional care is not a novelty. Physicians,"3 social
workers, 5 4 clergymen have employed it with substantial success. In other
50. Charles Zunzer, Crime and the Broken Home, an address before the U. S. Sub-
committee on Racketeering.
5I. Zunzer, Family Desertion (1929) 145 ANNALs 98-I04 (report on a study of 423
cases). The National Association of Legal Aid Organizations publishes each year detailed
statistics showing the source, nature and disposition of the cases handled by its member
organizations.
52. Bucklin, Studies in Breakdowns in Family Incomes: Broken Families (Mar. 193o)
2 THE FAmIy 3-13; Mowrer, The Study of Family Disorganization (May, 1927) 8 THE
FAMILY 83-87.
53. MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AmERiCAN PEOPLE (1932) (final report of the Committee on
the Costs of Medical Care).
54. WARNER, QUEEN AND HARPER, AMERICAN CHARITIES AND SOCIAl. WoRK (4th ed.
1930) 25-26. See I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAmIY LAws 266-267:
"Second only in importance to the termination of the marriage itself is the problem of
the property rights of the parties. The property of the wife which the husband has received
by virtue of the marriage must ordinarily be restored, and at common law the wife might
bring an action for its recovery. The nature of annulment being a restoration of the parties
to their former status, their rights of property existent at the time of marriage must be pro-
tected. But the mere restoration of rights would, in many cases, not guarantee justice to the
parties. The marriage, although voidable, may have given rise to effects that cannot be
equitably eradicated by a mere revival of the pre-marital status. Broadly speaking, the same
consideration may be present in marriages terminated by annulment as though divorce, and
the same rights and remedies would seem to be applicable. Therefore, it is not surprising to
find in connection with annulment action, provisions for temporary and permanent alimony,
as well as for restitution and division of the property of the parties ...
THE FAMILY WATCHDOG
branches of the law 55 it has been found useful. The state already protects
the small borrower by a small loans law, the inexperienced investor in
securities by a blue sky law, the purchaser of insurance by a state insurance
commissioner. It might do more good than harm if it gave timely rather
than belated aid to the individual who honestly and sincerely desires to marry
and establish a stable family.
A second criticism of the present procedure is the requirement that
the wronged individual secure his remedy by submitting to the litigation
process. To many lay people this is a serious mental hazard. The law
student reading his case book may find it convenient to think of the parties
to a case as symbols X and Y so that he may concentrate his attention upon
the functioning of the judicial process with its more or less abstract con-
cepts. The lawyer, accustomed to the din of judicial clashes, the routine
of a trial, the traditions 51 of the profession which view litigation as a
distinct improvement over trial by battle or ordeal, may have difficulty in
seeing the matter through the client's eyes. Exhibitionistic and litigious
persons may enjoy the publicity and excitement of the witness chair. There
is a record of an earlier day in this country when a term of court was a
social event 57 and much relished by some of our hardy forefathers. 5
But the trend of legal history is against litigation. The common law
offenses of maintenance and champerty were designed to discourage undue
controversy. In England the expense is an added deterrent. Early groups
in this country sought substitutes. 59
Many modern litigants do not press their legitimate claims to an ad-
judication because they are aware of the delay, expense and complexity of
litigation and the uncertainty of the result.60 Sensitive and perfectly honest
"Eleven states provide for permanent alimony to the wife, but some of them do so only
under expressly specified situations or when the annulment is upon a particular ground; only
four provide for temporary alimony. As to property, six states enact the common law rule
for the return to the wife of her real property, seven make provision for the wife's recovery
of her personalty, while five provide in general terms for an equitable adjustment of property
rights...
On the effect of judgment on nullity, see Table XXII, I id. at 267-272.
55. See the Annual Proceedings of the National Probation Association.
56. See the constitutions of the various states in which provisions such as the following
taken from the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights occur: "All courts shall be open." INDEX OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1915) (prepared for the N. Y. State Constitutional Convention by
the Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University).
57. I BEVERDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (I919) 284.
58. BRYcE, THE AmERicAN COMMONWEALTH (5th ed. 1923) 665 et seq.
59. Lewis, The Courts of Pennsylvania in the x7th Century (895) I PA. B. A. REP. 353.
6o. I VmuiERN, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 273-274; I id. at 230-231:
"The care, custody, and maintenance of the children of a marriage present essentially the
same practical problems whether the dissolution has been by device or by annulment; the
same moral obligations of parents toward their children are present, and the same practical
necessities demand attention ...
The fact remains, however, that only twenty-six of the fifty-one jurisdictions
have statutes on the subject; and of these, only nineteen have all-inclusive statutes providing
definitely for the care, custody, and maintenance of the children of all annulled marriages.
These statutes usually give the court discretion to make such orders as may be just and
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individuals dread the shock of conflict, the publicity, the torture of cross-
examination. 61  Whether out of consideration for such people or for other
reasons, the law has shown a disposition to acknowledge its obligation to
personalities as well as events.6 2  The domestic relations court 63 and the
trial of domestic matters in the privacy of a master's office 64 are examples.
At one time surgical operations were a horror to all concerned.
Anesthetics, disinfectants, expert diagnosis, improved nursing and hospital
facilities have accomplished a desirable improvement. It may be too much
to expect a legal anesthetic in the litigation process but one may take an
intelligent interest in building a system under which the innocent spouse
does not have to seek redress for domestic injury by the embarrassing task
of washing his dirty linen in public.65
A third criticism of the existing situation is the limited number of
problems which it can solve. Betrothal, and to a greater extent, marriage,
involves both parties in relations from which at any time the legal elements
of rights, property, legitimacy, support, alimony may arise. The annul-
ment may solve these purely legal problems but it can hardly hope to touch
the extra-legal matters. Social, medical, economic, psychological changes
occur of as much importance to the parties as if the field of law recognized
them. The failure to know in advance the facts which justify an annul-
ment and to prevent the fatal step often results in irreparable damage.
A decree of nullity is of limited value to a respectable woman who,
without legal fault, finds too late that she has married: a man afflicted with
venereal disease; a member of another race, in a community where mis-
cegination is disapproved by society; the man who enjoys marrying several
ladies in turn, without the formality of an intervening divorce; a man who
proper and for the best interests of the children, with power to modify such orders as circum-
stances may require.
As early as 19o6 leaders in the legal field were recognizing this condition. See Pound,
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (i9o6) 29 A. B.
A. REP. 395. See also SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 13-36.
61. See Griswold, How Many Times Have you Beet in Jail? (Nov. 1937) 124 AMERI-
CAN MAGAZINE 28; Pearson, What is Evidence? (Dec. 1937) 102 SCRBNER'S 26.
62. Bruno, Social Work and the Law (1937) 72 NAT. Ass'N OF LEGAL. Am ORGANIZA-
TION BULL. 29; Maniacal Wives (July 26, 1934) 26 TIMES, No. 4; Turano, Alimony Racket
(June, 1933) 29 Am. MERCURY, No. 114, 237.
63. Flexner, Oppenheimer and Lenroot, The Child, The Family and The Court (U. S.
Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Pub. No. 193) (933).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 23, § 36, provides: "When neither of the parties
takes a rule for a jury trial, or when after hearing, the rule is discharged the court may pro-
ceed to hear the cause or may, upon motion of either party, appoint a master to take testi-
mony and return the same to the court." To the same effect, see W. VA. CODE ANN. (1932)
§ 4726.
65. See, e., g., Durham Morning Herald, Nov. 2, 1937, p. I : "The marriage of Mary Lee
Williams and Ben Yocum was annulled at Mountain Grove, Mo., when it was discovered
that they were brother and sister. Twenty years ago their parents died. The brother and
sister were placed in an orphanage. The girl was adopted by Ben Williams of Chilhowee,
Missouri, and the boy by a farmer named Yocum. He got a job recently on the Williams
farm, fell in love with Mary, married her in secret. A chance remark by Mrs. Williams
resulted in the discovery of their relationship."
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is mentally unstable; a man who thought it was all a joke and never intended
marriage.
Much is said in legal education of the importance of a social view-
point. Here is a field for its practical application. If the fundamental
policy of the state is to build stable marriages, it can hardly afford to ignore
factors which may make for instability. To require a gathering of the
facts in advance by the impersonal state would be an improvement.
The final criticism of the present situation lies in the ineffectiveness
with which the state is enforcing its long asserted interest in marriage and
the family. In civil cases the state has no standing as a party in interest.
It must wait for an individual who is legally innocent to start the proceed-
ing. In criminal cases the state is a party in interest but its effectiveness is
in punishing the wrongdoer rather than untangling a domestic difficulty.
If the state, of its own motion, could inquire into marriages of questionable
legality, the existing prohibitions might be regarded as of greater significance
by those planning to evade them.
An annulment process in general is, at least theoretically, a contest
between two persons who have gone through a marriage ceremony. The
one who initiates it must be legally innocent. The adverse party must have
invaded some right and be legally at fault. If both are at fault the court is
likely to leave them where they are.66 If the court does act it is usually a
bare decree without reimbursement for damages. An improvement, but not
the whole answer, would be a statute giving the court discretion to act after
weighing all the circumstances.6 7
A criminal process in this field results in a fine or imprisonment for
the defendant. Perhaps he needs the services of a physician or a psychiatrist.
Perhaps others need to be warned not to marry him.
The state asserts an interest in marriage and the family, but it is not a
party to the dissolution proceedings. It can not initiate them but must rely
upon criminal prosecution. Such methods are an improvement over trial by
battle but do not compare with the progress made by other professional
groups in dealing with personalities as well as events.
In the light of the foregoing criticisms it is desirable to propose certain
remedies.
III. A Proposal for a Remedy
The criticisms of the existing situation refer to the fact that the con-
cepts and administrative machinery are remedial, require solution by litiga
tion, solve only a limited number of the inevitable problems confronting
the parties and fail to clarify the interest of the state in the stable family.
A remedy should include a change from a remedial to a preventive approach;
66. Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige lo8 (N. Y. 183o); Beeby v. Beeby, 162 Eng. Rep. 755(1799).
67. See N. Y. CONSoL. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 14, § 7 (I).
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solution by non-litigation methods as well as the time honored ones; provide
for some consideration of the social, economic and psychological problems
confronting the parties and clarify the interest of the state.
In particular, the present proposal suggests: a new statute and an edu-
cational campaign to inform the community of the advantages and disad-
vantages of the change; to gather the factual background necessary to sup-
port the program; and to check up on the functioning of the proposal with a
view to its improvement.
The statute might provide for the following:
i. The marriage license clerk would add to his existing tasks of pub-
licity and registration, duties of a quasi-judicial nature in determining
in limine whether any legal impediment existed to the particular marriage.
His status would become more like other administrative officials, commis-
sions and boards. An appeal from his decision should be to the regular
trial courts.
2. To enable him to make his decision, two devices would be necessary:
(a) the determination of the facts which he would need, and (b) the estab-
lishment of new and coordination of existing fact gathering agencies to this
particular end.
3. Assumption by the state of responsibility for the correctness of the
decision by public reimbursement to individuals for certain damages suffered
in cases where the marriage has been permitted by the license clerk and is
later declared void by the annulment court.
4. Assumption by the state of responsibility, codrdinate with that of
the party, for the inauguration of civil annulment proceedings in certain
cases.
IV. An Illustration
The workings of the plan will be clearer through the medium of a com-
parison of the present procedure with that proposed.
i. At Present
An applicant for a marriage license, as a matter of law, must at his
own peril ascertain the facts significant to him. In most instances, if he
fails to uncover data as to all but the essentials, 68 the courts will not free
him from his bonds no matter how personally distasteful. For collecting
the facts he may depend upon himself, 69 his family, a credit rating bureau
or a detective. Consider the expense, delay and impracticability of attempt-
ing by one's self to make a thorough check on another person as to such
68. Vannernan, supra note 43.
69. Marshall v. Marshall, 217 Cal. 736, 30o Pac. 816 (1931) ; Wetstine v. Wetstine, 114
Conn. 7, 157 AtI. 418 (193); Wier v. Still, 31 Iowa 107 (1870); Oswald v. Oswald, 146
Md. 313, 126 Atl. 81 (1924) ; Robertson v. Roth, 163 Minn. 501, 204 N. W. 329 (1925) ; Keyes
v. Keyes, 6 Misc. 355, 26 N. Y. Supp. gio (Super. Ct. 1893).
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matters as age, health, 70 present or previous marital experience, race, exist-
ing criminal record. Assuming that inquiries could be made locally, an
effort to secure a correct answer requires statewide, nationwide and some-
times international investigation. Consider also the psychological ob-
stacles; 1 the emotional condition of engaged persons; natural delicacy of
sentiment or shyness; ignorance as to where to go or what to look for in the
public records; the difficulty, in most jurisdictions, of requiring a physical
or psychiatric examination.
The modem family is almost equally impotent as a fact gathering and
evaluating agency. In a settled community where both parties and their
families were well acquainted the task should be comparatively simple. But
urbanization, the desire of young people to choose their own friends, the
ease of transportation and other factors are creating a screen behind which
the scoundrel successfully may hide. The credit agency 72 and the detective
are too expensive for the average person. In practice the system of indi-
vidual responsibility for fact gathering and evaluation breaks down.
2. Under the Proposal
Under the proposal there would be five stages in the process: the initial
application, fact gathering, giving the applicant certain items for personal
use, deciding whether or not to issue the license and caring for the occasional
case in which an annulment may be necessary.
A conveniently located marriage license bureau, with provisions for
privacy and a reasonably courteous staff would not cost much more than
at present. The application would be made on a form which experience
indicated was adequate and would contain such data as the applicant might
have gathered or surmised as a basis for the public study. It would be a
matter of common sense for both parties to apply. The fee should be suffi-
cient to cover the cost of investigation and, if desired, the premium on the
insurance policy later described.
A telephone call to the bureau of vital statistics, a fingerprint bureau,73
a clerk of court, a police department would reveal quickly and inexpensively
such data as was found by experience to be desirable as to identification,
birth, marital condition, criminal record. A public doctor, with duties
similar to those now performed by physicians in applications for life insur-
7o. Brown v. Scott, I4O Md. 258, 117 Atl. 1i4 (1922) ; Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 236 App.
Div. 271, 258 N. Y. Supp. 338 (ist Dep't, 1932). See Notes, Annulment of Marriage for
Fraudulent Misrepresentation (1933) I U. OF CHL L. REv. 128; The New York Rule of
Annulment of Marriage for Misrepresentation as to Wealth or Financial Status (0934) 68
U. S. L. REv. 449.
71. The present arrangement bears a remarkable resemblance to the time honored doc-
trine of caveat emptor. 8 HoLswoRTH, op. cit. siupra note 17, at 69.
72. More and Better Credit Bureaus Guide Retailers (Oct. 5, 1932) BusiNEss WEEK 8.
73. Making Their Marks (Oct. 12, 1935) i2o LITERARY DIGEST 38: "Have you had your
fingerprints taken? The question does not imply that you ever have been charged with a
crime. Today thousands are voluntarily having their fingerprints taken and filed."
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ance, could supply the necessary data on race and mental and physical health.
Honesty of intention or plans to defraud and coerce would be revealed in-
cidentally in a number of cases; but the present proposal does not purport
to solve all problems of fraud and duress. A statewide bureau organized
like a social service index 74 and a national bureau similar to many already
gathering other types of data in Washington, would enable the researcher
to extend the scope of his study.75
When the facts are gathered-and this may take only a few moments
or a day or two-the applicant would receive a document similar to a title
certificate 76 now issued by title insurance companies for the purpose of
advising vendor and vendee of objections on the record. The applicant
could then determine whether he wished to proceed. If he did, the license
clerk would then decide whether the record showed any facts which might
be the basis for annulment. If they were present and could not be removed
as by medical treatment, the procurement of a divorce, delay for a year or
two until the parties came of age, the application for a license would be re-
fused, subject to appeal to the courts.77
If the decision was to grant the application, the applicant would receive
two documents, the license and a policy of insurance by which the state
would guarantee the accuracy of the facts set forth in the earlier certificate
as being the only legal obstacles to marriage. These would vary depending
upon local conditions and points of view as to the fitness of things. If a
significant fact turned out to be other than as recited or a new one came to
light, the holder of the policy would be entitled to make a claim for damages.
After the parties were married, if an annulment was requested by one
of them or by the state, the claimant might receive according to the provi-
sions of the policy such compensation as the amount necessary to defray
the expense of annulment proceedings, the cost of medical care, as where
disease has been communicated, damages for the loss of a lucrative position
abandoned in good faith in reliance upon the validity of the marriage,
74. WARNER, QUEEN AND HARPER, op. Cit. Supra note 54, at 297: "One important device
for inter-agency teamwork, the social service exchange, was long ago developed by the
charity organization societies. This is an office in which are kept cards showing names,
addresses, other identifying data concerning clients, and the names of agencies inquiring about
them, with dates. By calling the exchange the worker can quickly discover whether any
other organization is dealing with a given family or has served it in the past."
75. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL (Nat. Emergency Council, 1937) 110: "The
Bureau of the Census is continuously engaged in the collection and compilation of statistics
covering wide and diversified fields of human welfare and economic activity. It takes the
decennial census of the United States which covers population, unemployment, agriculture,
mines, manufacturers and distribution."
See also, Vital Statistics, Special Reports, Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Vol. 3, No. 2, Feb. I, 1937, at 3.
76. NrBLAcK, AN ANALYSIS OF THE TomRNs SYSTEM OF CONVEYING LAND (1912);
NORTH AND VAN BUREN, REAL ESTATE TITLES AND CONVEYANCING (1927); THOMPSON,
EXAMINATION OF TITLES (1929); WARvELLE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON ABSTRACTS AND
EXAMINATIONS OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY (4th ed. 1921).
77. See Report of Commttee on Administrative Law of American Bar Association (1936)
6I A. B. A. REP. 720.
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provision for the expense of rearing and educating any children, treatment
for bona fide psychological shock. The insurance agencies are sufficiently
resourceful to supply a variety of policies to suit individual needs.
V. Discussion of the Proposal
Since the present article is admittedly on the side of regimentation, all
the criticisms of the individualists apply. Beyond them are objections which
deserve more particular answers. Some of them are: how much regimenta-
tion will the public accept, what is to become of these persons who are re-
fused a license, how will the proposal affect children under the legal age
who desire to marry, how is the money to be secured for necessary operating
expenses, how are people to be kept from developing a racket.
Business, as well as romance, is an element in marriage. A reasonable
degree of security will appeal to the prudent man. For this reason if the
proposal is made optional rather than compulsory it should appeal to a fair
percentage of the population as a shrewd business move. After such people
have accepted, it will be time enough to consider making it compulsory so
as to protect some impetuous, heedless individual from doing himself an
injury. It is an argument in favor of the proposal that the elements are
not new. It is merely a combination of well tried factors to meet a situation
which heretofore has not received such treatment. The King's Proctor in
England 78 and similar agencies in this country 79 are precedents. A public
insurance fund has many examples to guide those who desire to set it up.80
The theory of reimbursing people who have suffered from mistakes by the
state is also no novelty."' It is not a vain hope that an enlightened public
will accept the proposal as an improvement over the existing method.
A person who has been refused a license under this plan is in no worse
position than he would be after an annulment.8 2  If he proceeds to form an
illicit relationship, the same criminal laws, which now exist, are available
to deter and punish him. 3 Since the proposal does not include increasing
the causes for which annulment is granted, the problem would be the same
as today except that the state would come into it at an earlier stage before
78. i0 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 25, § 1212 et seq.
79. 3 MIcn. Comp. LAWs (1929) § 12783.
So. EmPLOYEES COMPENSATION AcT, 39 STAT. 742 (1916), 5 U. S. C. A. 751 et seq.
(1927) ; WAR RIsK INSuRANcE ACT, 43 STAT. 624 (1924), as amended, 43 STAT. 1309 (1925),
38 U. S. C. A. §§ 511, 512; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, created by the BANKING
AcT OF 1933, 48 STAT. 168 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §264 (1935); SociAL SECuIuTZ ACT, 49
STAT. 620 ('935), 42 U. S. C. A. §301 et seq. (Supp. 1937).
S1. BORCHARD, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice in CONVICTING THE INNO-
CENT (1932) 375.
82. See recent case note, Marriage-Annulment, Equitable Disabilities-Requisite of
Clean Hands (ig3i) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 309.
See also: Stoneburner v. Stoneburner, n Idaho 6o3, 83 Pac. 938 (9o5) ; Day v. Day,
71 Kan. 385, So Pac. 974 (1905) ; Smith v. Smith, 181 Ky. 55, 203 S. W. 884 (1918) ; Car-
michael v. Carmichael, io6 Ore. 198, 211 Pac. 916 (1923).
83. MiI.LER, CaimiNAL LAW (1924) c. 16.
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irreparable injury had been done. There may be wear and tear and shock
for the innocent applicant who is refused a license to marry. but this will
hardly compare to the distress and suffering arising in connection with an
annulment.
Children under the marriageable age present a peculiar problem today.
The proposal may be adapted to their needs by making statutory changes
so that a social or medical finding of marriageability will be the test rather
than a certain number of birthdays. s4 The clerk may be invested with
authority, subject to appeal to the juvenile court, to refuse or grant the
application in the interest of the minor. Such a balancing of the authorities
of parents and state, 5 not in itself a novelty,8  when employed in conjunc-
tion with aid from child welfare agencies or domestic advice clinics,87 will
cushion the shock of refusal to the child applicant and permit the inaugura-
tion of an adequate probationary period. Such a plan making use of
existing community agencies would cost little.
The expense of the plan might be met from initial deposits and insur-
ance premiums, from fines imposed criminally upon the rascals, or from the
public treasury. Perhaps a combination would prove desirable. It would
certainly be a good investment for the individual to pay the expenses himself
rather than be put to the problem of raising the cost of an annulment. To
know that in the last analysis one will receive a stated sum from an imper-
sonal and solvent estate rather than be required to face the perils of the
litigation process with another individual should be worth something.
If there is a temptation to develop a racket, the answer is to fight the
racket and punish the racketeers rather than not to attempt the plan. One
relies upon the ingenuity of insurance experts. The uniform marriage law 88
and the uniform marriage evasion act 89 should stop one sort of evasion.
VI. Conclusion
Here is a problem and a suggested solution. The solution should be
of value to the individual and to the state. The former benefits from the
stabilizing of a business matter inextricably bound up in marriage; from
84. I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMiLY LA'Ws i15-19, 119-128, treats of the age of the par-
ties and parental consent. See also Table V, I id. at 116-117 (age of the parties) ; and Table
VI, I id. at 121-124 (parental consent).
85. Carlisle, Compulsory Attendance Law in the United States; Historical Background
(1936) 4 EDUCATIONAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 35, Part II, p. 78; 31 ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
JOURNAL (1931) 504-513. In the exercise of the police power of the state, the legislature
may authorize boards of health to exclude from school all unvaccinated pupils even though
no smallpox may exist in the community at the time. A Texas case is in point. Zucht v.
King, 225 S. W. 267 (Tex. Civ. App. I92O).
86. In re Vasco, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N. Y. Supp. 552 (2d Dep't, 1933), 14 B. U. L.
REv. I96 (1934), 28 ILL. L. REv. 556 (I934), 12 TENN. L. REV. 59 (i934).
87. Popenoe, The Marriage Clinic (April, 1932) 7 PARENTS MAGAZINE 15: see also
Groves, Teaching Marriage at the University of North Carolina (i937) i6 SOCIAL FORCES 87.
88. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE LICENSE ACT, 9 U. L. A. (1932) 251-274.
89. UNIFORM MARRIAGE EvASIoN ACT, 9 id. at 275-280.
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an emphasis upon preventive rather than remedial law; from the necessity
of forcing a series of racial, economic, psychological and legal problems in
advance of the marriage, instead of before the annulment courts. The latter
will profit by having its position with regard to marriage clarified; by im-
pressing the public that marriage is a privilege available to those who have
achieved a certain excellence rather than a catchall; and by obtaining more
accurate data on those planning to marry which may be used as a basis for
further improvements in the law. There are disadvantages but it is urged
that they are outweighed.
